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Increased prominence and greater influence expose international non-governmental 
development and environmental organizations (INGOs) to increased demands for 
accountability from a wide variety of stakeholders—donors, beneficiaries, staffs, and 
partners among others.  This paper focuses on developing the concept of INGO 
accountability, first as an abstract concept and then as a strategic idea with very different 
implications for different INGO strategies.  We examine those implications for INGOs 
that emphasize service delivery, capacity-building, and policy influence.  We propose 
that INGOs committed to service delivery may owe more accountability to donors and 
service regulators; capacity-building INGOs may be particularly obligated to clients 
whose capacities are being enhanced; and policy influence INGOs may be especially 
accountable to political constituencies and to influence targets.  INGOs that are 
expanding their activities to include new initiatives may need to reorganize their 
accountability systems to implement their strategies effectively. 
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I.  Introduction 
 International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have emerged as 
important actors in two important, interconnected realms.  First, at the national level, 
INGO's have taken on significant roles in promoting the social, economic, and political 
development of the particular countries in which they are operating.   Their enlarged 
efforts provide disaster relief, deliver on-going social services, build local capacities for 
self-help, promote self-governance, and enhance the political and policy influence of 
marginalized populations (Fisher, 1993; Clark, 1991; Edwards and Hulme, 1996).  
Second, at the international level, INGOs have been increasingly important in creating a 
kind of international civil society, animating informal but powerful normative regimes, 
and influencing the practices and policies of international institutions (Boli, 1999; Fox 
and Brown, 1998; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2000; Florini, 2000).   
 Increased prominence and greater influence expose INGOs to closer scrutiny and 
sharper demands for accountability.  Donors demand that the INGOs be accountable for 
the integrity, efficiency, and impact of programs that they have funded.  Beneficiaries 
press INGOs to live up to their rhetoric about fostering locally-determined development 
rather than impose their own priorities.  Staffs expect INGOs to live up to the high 
purposes that drew their commitment to the enterprise.  Partners whom INGO's have 
recruited in their efforts to achieve their national and international goals (such as other 
NGOs, community-based organizations, government agencies, businesses) expect the 
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INGOs to live up to promises they made in forging their partnerships.  Even those who 
are the targets of INGOs demand a kind of accountability from them; they want to know 
to whom the INGOs are accountable and for whom the INGOs speak so that they can 
gauge the force and legitimacy of the claims that these organizations are making against 
them.  In short, many different stakeholders call INGOs to account for their activities 
(e.g., Edwards, 2000). 
The purpose of this paper is to develop our understanding of the concept of 
accountability for INGOs—particularly INGOs focused on development and 
environmental protection.  We begin by presenting the idea of accountability as an 
abstract ideal.  In this conception, accountability is morally good, and it is unambiguous 
to whom and for what INGOs should be accountable.  In the second part of the paper, we 
present accountability not as an abstract, fixed moral ideal, but instead as a strategic idea 
to be formulated and acted upon by an INGO with the goal of better understanding and 
achieving its strategic purposes.  In this conception, accountability is both morally good 
and practically useful.  And, instead of there being one right answer of how best to 
structure accountability, one gives a contingent answer.  Accountability choices should 
advance the strategy an INGO is trying to execute.  In the third part of the paper, we 
show how three different activities or strategies embraced by INGOs—service delivery, 
capacity-building, and political advocacy—require quite different structures of 
accountability.  This suggests that as INGOs change the balance of their efforts across 
these different strategies, they have to change their conceptions of accountability, as well 
as the ways they make themselves accountable to their various stakeholders. 
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II.  The Concept of Accountability 
We say that an actor (whether an individual or an organization) is "accountable" 
when the actor recognizes that it has made a promise to do something, and has accepted a 
moral and legal responsibility to do its best to fulfill that promise (Cutt and Murray, 
2000; Paul, 1992; Najam, 1996; Fox and Brown, 1998).   
Because accountability involves a promise to perform, it is natural to think of 
accountability as a relationship among two or more actors.  In principle, however, an 
actor could feel and act as though it were accountable to an abstract purpose.  An INGO 
for example, could reasonably say that it was accountable for the achievement of some 
transcendent moral value such as the advancement of human rights, or the continuation of 
dedicated service to the disadvantaged, or for responding effectively to some urgent 
human need such as hunger or genocide.  They might feel accountable to these moral 
goals independent of the demands of funders, partners, or even clients.  In this view, 
primary accountability is to “the cause,” and expectations of others are important only 
insofar as they align with this important duty. 
 More often, however, we think of accountability as a concrete relationship among 
two or more parties.  We say that one party is accountable to another for the execution of 
some duty promised by the former.  For example, an INGO may be accountable: a) to 
donors for the proper handling of donated resources, b) to clients and beneficiaries for 
the delivery of high-quality, responsive services, c) to staff for continued support of the 
mission that drew them to the organization, or c) to partners and allies for living up to 
commitments for action made in the course of developing and executing a joint project. 
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 The idea of accountability as a moral ideal may also include a requirement that an 
actor make it easy for the stakeholders to monitor the extent to which it has lived up to its 
promises.  We can say, for example, that one actor is more accountable than a second is if 
the first actor provides more information about his performance, or is more responsive to 
stakeholder expectations and demands. 
 Obviously, the concrete structures and processes through which one actor 
becomes accountable to another can vary on several different dimensions (Moore and 
Gates, 1986).  For example, the substantive terms of the agreement between two actors 
can be more or less general, and more or less exacting.  “Grants,” for example, typically 
create substantive terms that impose only very general demands on the organizations.  
"Contracts," on the other hand, are typically far more exacting.  The substantive terms 
can also vary as to whether they focus on desired end results (outcomes), or on the 
activities that are expected to produce the results (activities or outputs). 
Similarly, the accountability relationship may specify more or less onerous 
reporting procedures.  Some systems of accountability demand weekly accounting of 
many detailed events; others work well with annual reporting on only a few dimensions. 
 Whatever the initial structure of the accountability, the terms can change over 
time.  Often, in the early phases of development initiatives when the tasks remain 
unclear, it is hard to set clear expectations to which actors can be held strictly accountable 
(Brown and Fox, 1998; Jordan and van Tuijl, 2000).  Moreover, when relationships rest 
on a general sense of shared purpose in which the partners trust each other’s good 
intentions and capabilities, a more general “political responsibility” may be more 
appropriate than detailed contracts  (Jordan and van Tuijl, 2000).  As more detailed 
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strategies evolve and specific responsibilities are accepted, however; or as trust is eroded 
by misunderstandings and disappointed expectations; creating more specific terms of 
accountability can become important.   
 The idea that accountability defines a relationship is important not only morally 
and theoretically, but also as a practical reality, for the existence of the relationship is 
important in enforcing the agreement.  Commitments made to others create agents who 
have stakes in enforcement.  Of course, other attributes of the relationship – such as 
power differences or degrees of trust – affect the extent to which the parties can hold each 
other accountable.  In some cases, organizations can ignore their accountability to 
stakeholders who are not powerful enough to enforce their claims.  But they do so at their 
moral if not practical peril.  
Much of the literature on accountability assumes two parties in a morally and 
legally asymmetrical relationship.  “Principal-agent” theory, for example, focuses on how 
principals can hold agents accountable for performance that meets the principal’s 
expectations (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Zeckhauser and Pratt, 1985).  The normative 
assumption in this formulation is that it is the principal's purposes that ought to be 
faithfully realized through the partnership, not the agent's.  Defections from the 
principal’s purposes in the interests of the agent threaten both the moral integrity and 
efficiency of this relationship.  The practical challenge is to devise incentive schemes 
(structures of accountability) that reliably motivate the agent to advance the principal's 
interests. 
 For INGOs, however, we believe it is misleading to assess accountability in 
principal-agent terms.  The reasons are essentially two.   
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First, INGOs are accountable to many different stakeholders, and it is not entirely 
clear as a moral or legal matter which one of these stakeholders should be celebrated as 
the principal whose preferences ought to be given the greatest weight.  When one is 
thinking in principal/agent terms it is natural to think that an INGO's principal is the 
donor whose contributions sustain the INGO's activities.  After all, they are the ones who 
are providing the funds.  They ought, as a moral and legal matter, to be able to say what 
purposes the INGO should achieve.  They are the ones who look most like the owners of 
a firm that provided the implicit model for the principal/agent model. 
Yet, it is not at all clear that INGOs should, as a moral or legal matter, give their 
donors this pride of place.  Organizations such as Oxfam, Amnesty International, and 
CARE do make promises to donors.  They say at the time that they solicit funds that they 
will advance particular purposes and aid particular beneficiaries.  In making such 
promises, they make themselves accountable to the donors for the efficient and effective 
pursuit of these aims.  This poses no problems as long as the donor's purposes are closely 
aligned with the organization's mission and its obligations to particular clients.   
But in the course of executing their mission, organizations like Oxfam, Amnesty 
International, and CARE, make additional promises.  They promise clients and 
beneficiaries that they can count on their assistance.  They promise partners that they will 
live up to specific agreements they made in joint projects.  In making these promises they 
become accountable to many stakeholders other than donors.  Again, when all these 
different accountabilities align, there is no difficulty.  When, however, the expectations 
and claims of the different stakeholders are not aligned, the INGO has to decide which of 
the claims should be honored.   
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In an important sense, it is that question that is answered when one of the 
stakeholders is described as the principal, and the others simply as stakeholders.  What it 
means to be the principal is to be the stakeholder with the strongest moral and legal claim 
on the assets and activities of the organization.   
In the case of INGOs however, it is not clear which of the stakeholders should be 
so honored.  Should those who have the gold make the rules?  Or, should those for whose 
benefit the organization exists call the shots? And what room should be made for the 
claims of those comrades in arms with whom one shares the responsibility for the larger 
cause? 
Note that one way to decide which of many stakeholders should be viewed as the 
principal whose aims ought to be honored is simply on the basis of power.  The more 
powerful the stakeholder, the stronger the claim to be a principal.  Prudence might well 
support this judgment, since, by definition, there are important prices to be paid for 
resisting the claims of powerful stakeholders.  Yet, the difficulty is that many INGOs are 
committed to changing the existing power relationships.  They are, there at least in part, 
to give their clients and beneficiaries a more powerful claim against the donors; to insist 
that the funds available to the donor be used for the benefit of the clients in ways that the 
clients think are best.  To decide that the principal is the most powerful stakeholder 
would be to sacrifice this important purpose of INGOs. 
Of course, it is not easy for INGOs to challenge the power of those who provide 
the funds they need to operate.  In doing so, they run the risk that they will alienate 
important sources of support, and lose their capacity to help the clients and beneficiaries 
they seek to aid.  Yet, many INGOs run these risks because they believe that their 
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mission requires them to do so.  Oxfam-America, for example, refuses to take 
government money on grounds that the government may insist on advancing its purposes 
rather than those of Oxfam’s clients.  It then uses the freedom it gains by relying on less 
exacting donors to make its programs responsive to clients rather than funders.  Other 
organizations have emphasized the importance of remaining accountable to transnational 
INGO alliances and the political and operational capacities such alliances represent rather 
than yielding to the demands of particular donors. 
The facts that INGOs have many different stakeholders to whom they might owe 
some accountability, that the different stakeholders have different amounts of effective 
power to insist that their expectations be satisfied, and that the INGO's often seek to re-
balance power relationships, lead to the conclusion that the decision about which 
stakeholders should be viewed as the principal is hardly a straightforward question.  With 
this analysis, we can see that describing one stakeholder as the principal represents an 
important judgement about the ordering of the stakeholder claims on organizational 
performance.  But it is not clear what principles or criteria one should use to order these 
claims.   
One could make such a judgment on a moral or ethical basis.  That is, one could 
decide that one stakeholder is more deserving than another; that a donor's claims deserve 
to be taken seriously because he paid for them.  One could also decide that a client's 
claims should be emphasized because their satisfaction is the whole point of the 
organization's efforts, or that a partner's claims should be met because they have earned 
the right through faithful service.   
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Alternatively, one could make the judgment on a legal basis.  That is, one could 
look at the law and determine which of the claims against the organization would be 
given priority, if a court were asked to resolve the dispute.  This would tend to give the 
greatest weight to those with whom one had signed contracts, probably privileging 
donors and partners over clients.   
One could also decide the matter on a prudential basis.  That is, one could look at 
the consequences of honoring or resisting a claim on the survivability of the organization 
in the future.   
Or, finally, one could decide the matter as a matter of strategic judgment.  That is, 
one could decide how to balance moral, legal, and prudential concerns in a way that is 
calculated to allow the organization to define and achieve its mission.   
In the next section of this paper, we will argue that it is best for INGOs to think 
about the issue of accountability not simply as an abstract, moral and legal issue, nor 
simply as a prudential question about whom it is safe to ignore.  We will instead argue it 
as a key strategic issue that will help the organization define and achieve its highest 
value. 
 
III.  Organizational Mission and Strategy in INGOs 
INGO “accountability” must be understood partly as a legal and moral imperative, 
but more importantly as a strategic choice.  The issue of accountability arises because 
various INGO stakeholders believe they have the moral and legal right (as well as the 
effective power) to make claims on what the organization does with its bundle of assets.   
The problem of accountability arises because the claims of the various stakeholders are 
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not necessarily coherently aligned with one another.  Nor do they necessarily align 
perfectly with the purposes of those that lead and staff the organizations.  As a result, the 
INGO’s leadership must make choices to embrace or resist particular stakeholder 
demands.   
These decisions about which stakeholder demands for accountability should be 
embraced and which resisted can have a profound impact on the INGO’s mission, 
strategy, and operations, since demands for accountability are potentially important 
drivers of organizational behavior.  If INGOs’ structures and systems of accountability 
are aligned with the mission of the organization, as the leadership now understands it, 
demands for accountability will neither reduce autonomy nor alter purposes.  If, however, 
the demands are at odds with organizational purposes (as defined by the current 
leadership), the INGO may have to shield itself from those demands to pursue its “true” 
purpose.   
The difficulty, of course, is that resisting demands for accountability from specific 
stakeholders can weaken their support.  Funders may withdraw support to INGOs that are 
seen as unwilling to be accountable for the efficient use of resources.  Newspaper stories 
that question the use of funds by child sponsorship INGOs like World Vision or Save the 
Children, for example, can seriously harm their ability to raise funds from private donors.  
Committed staff can stop working hard if the INGO fails to embody the values and 
missions that brought them to the organization.  Program partners may stop cooperating if 
their expectations are not met.  Losses such as these could hurt the INGO more than the 
threatened deflection from its goals or purposes.   Such losses could be large enough even 
to threaten the organization’s survival.   
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The implication, then, is that crafting an INGO mission and strategy is at least 
partly a decision about structuring its accountabilities.  The INGO effectively trades 
accountability for support; by making itself accountable to the expectations of particular 
stakeholders, the INGO earns their continued support. 
The relationship between accountability and strategy becomes clearer if we use 
the “strategic triangle” developed for positioning nonprofit organizations in dynamic 
funding and task environments (Moore, 2000).  Figure 1 presents the strategic triangle.  
The points of the triangle are meant to focus attention on three crucial calculations 
leaders must make if their organizations are to survive, produce socially valuable results, 
and successfully adapt to changing circumstances. 
The circle labeled “value” reminds INGO leaders that the INGO exists to 
accomplish some public purpose.  INGOs might have many purposes—improving the 
lives of poor children, or building rural self-help organizations, or reducing 
environmental pollution, or combating violations of human rights.  The point is that the 
INGO needs to tell a plausible story about the value it seeks to achieve and how it will do 
so.  The story provides a sense of purpose, helps mobilize and sustain support, and 
creates a focus for developing and deploying the organization’s operational capacities  
(Moore, 1995:Ch.  3). 
The circle labeled “legitimacy and support” reminds INGO leaders that they must 
be able to mobilize the political, legal, and financial support needed to achieve their 
goals.  In the for-profit sector, customers who buy the products and services a firm 
produces confer both legitimacy and financial support.  The customer's decision
   
 








to spend money on the organization's products and services simultaneously provides a 
revenue stream that allows the organization to remain in operation (support), and 
provides evidence that the organization is producing something that individuals value (a 
kind of legitimacy).  In the not-for-profit sector, however, the idea of “legitimacy and 
support” is somewhat more complex (Moore, 2000).  To a degree, “support” in the 
nonprofit sector means the same thing that it does in the for profit sector: namely, a flow 
of money and material resources that allows the organization to stay in operation.  
  13 
Typically, however, only a small portion of INGO support comes from sales to paying 
customers.  Instead, INGO financial resources come from financial “contributors”—
individuals, or foundations, or governments—who are willing to pay for delivering 
services to beneficiaries who cannot pay for the services themselves.   
Dependence for financial support on “contributors” creates some important 
accountability dilemmas for INGOs.  First, it creates the possibility that differences 
between the preferences of donors and clients might arise.  Second, to the extent that 
these differences do arise, the INGO faces the difficult ethical, legal, and strategic 
question of to whom the INGO should make itself most accountable.  The convenient  
integration of accountabilities in the private sector concept of customers is dis-integrated 
for INGOs who face potentially conflicting  obligations to contributors on one hand, and 
to clients on the other. 
In the INGO context, the idea of "legitimacy and support" includes flows of other 
needed resources beyond money.  Many INGOs rely on voluntarily contributed time and 
effort, both from volunteers and from staff paid less than market value for their talents.  
Many INGOs also benefit from contributions of food, medicine, equipment, and other in-
kind goods. 
Finally, the concept of “legitimacy and support” focuses on the political and 
social recognition of the organization’s right to exist, to operate for particular purposes in 
particular locations, and to press claims on others.  The narrowest conception of 
legitimacy, of course, is the right of the organization to exist at all.  In many countries 
INGOs have to work hard to gain the right to exist and to operate, and they may need to 
create alliances with other actors to carry out their programs.  When PLAN International 
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sought to begin a child sponsorship programs in India, for example, the Government of 
India required it to work in partnership with Indian NGOs rather than start its own 
branches.  INGOs can seek to expand this kind of “legitimacy” by associating themselves 
with universally popular goals, or by acquiring a reputation for expertise, or by 
representing important constituencies.  Without such legitimacy, it can be very difficult 
for INGOs to carry out their programs.   
The third circle of the strategic triangle – “operational capacity” – focuses the 
attention of INGO leaders on their ability to deliver program results.  It is here that one 
confronts the familiar, demanding technical and operational questions of how best to 
deploy available financial, material, and political resources to produce desired results.  
We use the term “operational capacity” (rather than “organizational capacity”) to 
emphasize that, for many INGOs, the capacity needed to deliver results lies outside their 
organizational boundaries.  Many INGO aspirations—sustainable development in poor 
communities, or international regimes that protect human rights—must be “co-produced” 
with partners who are not subject to the INGO’s authority.  Many INGOs must focus 
mobilize and sustain partnerships and coalitions rather than attend exclusively on their 
own organizations to produce results (Uvin, Jain and Brown, 2000). 
What is challenging about this conception of strategy is meeting all of these 
constraints simultaneously.  If the INGO has value and support, but no capability, it will 
not deliver on its promises.  If the INGO has value and capability but no support, it will 
fail for want of resources or legitimacy.  If the INGO has support and capacity, but 
produces little of value, it survives, but only at the price of wasting resources.   
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The need to integrate these three circles brings issues of accountability to the fore 
because each of these circles can be seen as demanding a kind of accountability.  INGOs 
are accountable to achieving some valued purposes encoded in their understanding of 
their mission.  That concept of mission could have come from the original commitments 
and traditions of the organization, or the moral commitments of its current leaders, or the 
urgency of the problems the organization now confronts and chooses to take as their own 
to solve.  The legitimacy and support circle reminds INGO leaders of their accountability 
to those who provide resources, authorize its existence, or allow it to speak for them.  The 
operational capacity circle reminds INGO strategists that it is accountable to the staff and 
the partners who carry out programs.  In this sense the choice of organizational strategy is 
a negotiated deal among the stakeholders to whom the INGO owes accountability.  A 
successful strategy would be one that aligned these different kinds of accountabilities. 
 
IV.  INGO Strategy and Accountability 
International NGOs differ from one another in the kind of role they choose to play 
in fostering human development, and the strategies and activities they rely upon to help 
them achieve their goals.  One influential analysis has sorted INGOs into “generations” 
that emphasize relief and welfare services, community organization and capacity-building 
for self-help, creating sustainable development systems, and catalyzing large-scale social 
movements (Korten, 1989).  More recently, Vakil (1997) has argued that INGOs can be 
classed into five functional categories: welfare, development (in the sense of capacity-
building), advocacy, development education, and networking or research.    
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We will examine three INGO roles: (a) welfare and service delivery, (b) capacity-
building for self help, and (c) policy and institutional influence.  These roles are common 
for INGOs.   We think they are also best served by quite different structures of 
accountability.  This means that INGO strategists must decide about organizational roles 
before they set up structures of accountability.  It also means that INGOs that change 
their strategies may have to consider how to change their accountability systems as well.  
For some organizations, rooted in an existing structure of accountability, shifting basic 
functions may not be feasible. 
Table 1 identifies actors relevant to accountability systems for these different 
INGO roles.  We turn now to exploring the implications of different functions and 
activities for accountability. 
 
Table 1:  Accountability Stakeholders for Different Kinds of INGOs 
 




Deliver goods and 
services to less served 
beneficiaries 
Empower and build 
capacity of clients for self-
help  















Donors and other resource 
providers; 
Technical service experts 
and regulators 





Donors and other resource 
providers; 
Policy experts and 
regulators; 





Partners or allies in 
delivering services 
INGO Staff;  
Partners in building 
capacities; 
Client co-producers of 
capacity 
INGO Staff; 
Allies in influence 
campaigns; 
Members represented by 
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Welfare and Service Delivery INGOs 
Welfare and service delivery INGOs deliver products or services designed to 
benefit clients or to improve the state of the world.  They are valuable primarily as  
producing organizations that 1) mobilize resources, such as money, volunteer time and 
energy, and materials; and 2) transform or allocate -those resources higher value uses.   
The value contributed by the INGO is high if no resources are diverted to inappropriate 
purposes (integrity), some valuable use can be found for each of the resources 
(efficiency), and the maximum amount of value is wrung out of the overall stock of 
resources (effectiveness). 
Boards and CEOs of INGOs will feel accountable to groups who provide those 
resources as a matter of prudence (they guarantee the future survival of the 
organization!), as a matter of law (there may be some enforceable promises made about 
how assets will be used), and as a matter of ordinary morality (it would be wrong to take 
money on false pretenses).  What the organization owes to these donors is to produce the 
maximum feasible return in terms of mission effectiveness.   
The service delivery INGO may also be accountable to its “beneficiaries” or 
“clients.”  In the for-profit sector, corporate law tilts accountabilities in the direction of 
the shareholders, though corporations have some responsibilities to their customers.  In 
the INGO sector, Boards and CEOs also face this dual accountability to financial 
contributors and clients.  One might think that this tension would be resolved more 
decisively in favor of clients when conflicts exist, since the whole point of the INGO is to 
benefit its clients.  In reality, however, a gap can often appear in the preferences and 
desires of contributors and those of the clients.  Many INGOs are set up to achieve 
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relatively abstract purposes: to reduce hunger, or prevent AIDS, or protect biodiversity.  
In order to accomplish these ends they have to interact with individual clients and 
produce results that may benefit those clients.  But producing benefits to individual 
clients is not the same as achieving the desired social result. The satisfaction of famine 
victims may not indicate long-term reductions in hunger; alleviating the misery of AIDS 
victims may not signal better prevention; and approval from rainforest residents may not 
indicate reduced threat to biodiversity.  Client satisfaction may not be a good indicator of 
success.    
 The problem grows potentially worse when clients do not pay for INGO services.  
Donors may say that their purpose is to benefit clients, and allow the clients to define 
what it is that they want.  In the more ordinary case, however, donors seek results that 
may or may not make individual clients better off in their own subjective terms.  
Programs to reduce population growth offer birth control education and materials, even if 
the clients would prefer food or income assistance. 
  Because there is a distinction between achieving social results desired by 
contributors and satisfying clients, INGOs face tensions between satisfying donors and 
keeping clients happy.  Prudentially, the interests of the donors will weigh heavily with 
INGO leaders, since the INGO cannot continue without their support.  Legally, donor 
interests will also count, particularly if resources were conveyed via contracts rather than 
grants or contributions.  Morally, however, the interests of the clients often take 
precedence.   
These tensions can produce serious dilemmas.  For example, auditors in one 
INGO summarily ended a program when they found a Southern NGO partner had 
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engaged in padding an expense account.  The fact that this decision would end a large 
children’s program, since no alternative partners were available, was never discussed, so 
impacts on constituencies other than donors were never considered in the decision.     
 For service delivering INGOs, the claims of employees, partners, and co-
producers are ranked lower than those of donors and clients are.  The reason is that these 
stakeholders are viewed as instruments for achieving the organization’s objectives—not 
as ends in themselves.  Consequently, their claims are often seen as detracting from the 
INGO’s ability to deliver the maximum value to contributors and clients.  Of course, the 
INGO might benefit from paying a fair market price for supplies and work from 
employees, and it might be more effective if it treated employees well.  But if the value 
added by the organization is conceived primarily in terms of delivering services, then 
both management and committed staff are likely to resist diverting resources away from 
those services.  Both management and staff will be inclined to privilege the claims of the 
donors (who want the most value delivered to clients), and clients (who want the most 
value they can get) over the claims of employees and suppliers.  This ordering of 
priorities and accountabilities also helps to explain why INGOs tend not to invest 
resources in staff development and capacity-building, even when it might serve the long-
term interest of the organization to do so.    
 
Capacity-building INGOs 
 Capacity-building INGOs focus on working with clients to enhance their abilities 
to help themselves rather than providing services for clients in a potentially paternalistic 
way.  Oxfam-America, for example, has long sought to create partnerships by which local 
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actors can pursue their local aspirations and solve their own problems (e.g., Offenheiser, 
1999).  A recent study found that most U.S. development INGOs were working in 
partnership with Southern NGOs to carry out some programs and saw capacity-building 
as an increasingly central feature of their work (Leach, Kalegaonkar and Brown, 1998). 
 A great deal changes in organizational accountability once it commits to working 
with rather than doing for clients.  The capacity-building focus implies a commitment to 
strengthening clients’ abilities to carry out their own purposes and aspirations, rather than 
achieve those purposes specified by the INGO or its contributors.  Capacity-building 
INGOs commit themselves to more accountability to their clients.  This means not only 
that they will allow their clients to influence the means used to accomplish goals, but also 
that they will reconsider ends that are challenged by clients.  If an INGO offers training 
in financial management, and the clients say they need help with political advocacy, then 
capacity-building INGOs might shift from training in financial management to training in 
advocacy.   
 There are several reasons why accepting this degree of accountability to clients as 
compared with other stakeholders makes sense.  First, as a moral matter, it shows respect 
for the clients’ interests in defining their own development needs.  Second, as a practical 
matter, capacity-building initiatives focused on problems relevant to the clients are more 
likely to produce impacts they will value.  Third, clients who care about the problem are 
more likely to invest in building capacity to deal with it.  Fourth, success in dealing with 
locally recognized problems builds client capacities that can be used to tackle other 
problems. 
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 Placing a high value on client concerns, however, can create dilemmas when other 
powerful stakeholders have strong interests.  A capacity-building INGO in Asia provides 
its diagnostic assessments to NGO clients but not to the donors that fund those 
assessments, on the theory that clients will speak more frankly about problems if they are 
not worried about donor evaluations.  Some donors have accepted this logic; others refuse 
to fund work that they cannot easily oversee.    
A persistent difficulty for capacity-building INGOs responsive to their clients is 
that results are hard to predict.  Outcomes depend in large part on what the clients want 
and are prepared to do, not on what the INGO plans.  Even with agreement on goals, 
clients may choose methods and technologies that do not seem right to either INGOs or 
their supporters.  Traditional tribal or clan elites who reject suggestions made by women 
or marginalized populations may dominate local decisions.  Responsibility and resources 
may be allocated by criteria that the INGO disapproves.  Indeed, different priorities have 
been apparent in recent discussions at the International Forum on Capacity-building.   
Northern actors think of “capacity-building” in terms of managerial skills, such as 
accounting, that enable good use of donor resources, while Southern clients want to 
strengthen their abilities for policy advocacy, coalition building, and fostering large scale 
social change (IFCB, 2000).   
 Shifting primacy in accountability from donors to clients tests the generosity and 
commitment of donors.  Clients may challenge their assumptions about effective practice, 
good governance, and fiscal accountability.  Many donors—especially those accustomed 
to service delivery roles—may agree with capacity-building commitments at the outset 
and later find that these commitments are difficult to keep.  Sometimes donors and INGO 
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staffs seek to preserve or re-institute service delivery accountabilities, even at the risk of 
increasing program costs, eroding trust, and reducing innovation and flexibility.  Thus, 
some of the gains of shifting from a service delivery to capacity-building approach may 
be undermined by accountability relationships that fail to reflect the shifts required by the 
capacity-building strategy. 
 
Policy Influence INGOs 
A third kind of INGO helps individuals and organizations press their claims 
against national and international institutions (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Fox and Brown, 
1998; Jordan and van Tuijl, 2000).  Some policy and institutional influence INGOs speak 
on behalf of populations that are otherwise without a political voice.  Amnesty 
International, for example, challenges violations of human rights in many countries on 
behalf of prisoners of conscience.  Others seek to reform political and institutional 
contexts that harm marginalized populations.  Transparency International, for example, 
seeks to reduce corruption that undermines sustainable development and economic justice 
around the world, and the Environmental Defense Fund challenges practices that harm 
the natural environment in different settings.    
Policy Influence INGOs resemble service delivery and capacity-building 
organizations in that they mobilize and deploy resources to accomplish their missions.  
They are organizations with inputs and outputs.  What distinguishes policy influence 
INGOs from service delivery or capacity-building organizations, however, is that their 
goals are to produce effective political demands for action on others.  They seek to make 
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other organizations recognize problems or to be accountable to commitments they have 
already made.   
Policy influence INGOs engage in many activities.  They make arguments for the 
importance or justice of their causes.  They conduct research to show the size and extent 
of problems.  They organize demonstrations to mobilize support.  They gather evidence 
about compliance with existing laws and policies.   And they press for laws and policies 
that further their goals.  Policy influence INGOs organized the international campaigns to 
regulate Nestlé’s sales of infant formula, for example (Johnson, 1989).  Other policy 
influence INGOs campaigned to change the World Bank’s indigenous peoples policy 
(Gray, 1998).  While still other campaigns seek to influence public awareness as well as 
policies, such as the environmental campaigns against global warming or the Jubilee 
2000 campaign to reduce developing country debts (Keck and Sikkink, 1998; Pettifor, 
2000).    
Policy influence INGOs are also accountable to many stakeholders.  They have 
boards, financial contributors, and others who authorize them to take action.  They have 
volunteer and paid staffs that carry out their programs, and organizational allies in policy 
campaigns.  They rely on two kinds of clients to create policy influence results: the 
constituents they represent and those policy-makers and implementing organizations that 
are the targets of their campaigns. 
INGOs’ influence over those whom they target, and from whom they demand 
accountability, depends on many factors.  These include the target actor's vulnerability to 
public opinion and sanctions, the extent to which external campaigns can affect the 
availability of strategic resources, and the degree to which the values of the targeted 
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organization are aligned with those that the INGO represents.  Many INGO campaigns 
rely heavily on appealing to widely held values and challenging the actions of 
institutional targets that violate their own publicly announced standards.  The Jubilee 
2000 campaign for debt relief drew on Judeo-Christian traditions to advocate debt 
forgiveness (Pettifor, 2000), while the campaign against India’s Narmada Dams 
emphasized the project’s failure to develop a resettlement plan that met the World Bank’s 
own standards (Udall, 1998). 
Credible challenges to target accountability, however, require that INGOs be able 
to answer questions about their own accountability.  Their targets, and the wider 
audiences they need to help them press their claims against the targets, both want to know 
why INGOs are legitimate voices in these debates.   
Some policy influence INGOs can ground their legitimacy in their service to 
widely-held values, and argue that their legitimacy is rooted in nothing more than the 
commitment to these transcendent values.  The Campaign to Ban Landmines, for 
example, appealed to widespread concern about innocent victims of landmines (Goose, 
2000), and the campaigns to reduce violence against women reflect changing values 
about gender differences around the world (Keck and Sikkink, 1998).  This basis for 
accountability puts a premium on access to the media and to wider publics whose views 
can validate and support pressure on key actors.    
Other INGOs influence policy through their access to expertise and information 
that is important to policy formulation and implementation.  When INGOs can establish 
the validity of their information and its relevance to policy-making, their credibility as 
actors in the process increases.  The Environmental Defense Fund, for example, was able 
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to demonstrate the World Bank projects in Brazil were not living up to the Bank’s own 
policies for requiring grassroots participation, and so influenced the disbursement of 
Bank funds (Keck, 1998).  Accountability for INGOs that rely on information and 
expertise may be exercised through assessment of their data collection and analysis by 
technical criteria and experts.    
A third basis for accountability of policy influence INGOs focuses on the extent 
to which they represent constituents for whom the political influence is mobilized.  If the 
INGO claims to represent local constituents, then they are most accountable to those 
constituents. 
Policy influence INGOs that represent political interests might need a governance 
structure that differs from that of service delivery organizations.  Effective service 
INGOs may have small boards of trustees and a few large donors, but keep beneficiaries 
largely outside governance structures.  Influence INGOs, in contrast, might widen their 
structures of accountability.  They might recruit many small donors as members to widen 
their political as well as their financial bases.  They might expand their accountability by 
bringing clients on their boards or by making them members rather than treating them as 
external clients or beneficiaries.  At the extreme this trend blurs the boundary between 
organization and clients, incorporating clients into organizational governance.  In essence 
this transforms the “other-serving” organizational form of service delivery INGOs into 
the “member-serving” form of advocacy INGOs.    
The problems of accountability for influence INGOs then shift to relations with 
the constituencies the INGO claims to represent.  Often these accountabilities are difficult 
to define, given the social and political distances between INGOs and grassroots 
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constituencies, and even more difficult to enforce (Brown and Fox, 1998; Jordan and van 
Tuijl, 2000).  Accountability becomes dependent on arrangements for consultation, 
information exchange, and dispute resolution across large differences in wealth, power, 
and culture.  As INGOs focus more on political influence, they may need to construct 
consultative mechanisms to develop strategies, set agendas, and make decisions.     
 
V.  Conclusion: Fitting Organizational Strategy to Structures of Accountability 
 Table 2 briefly summarizes this comparison of INGOs in terms of accountability 
relationships and priorities.  The Table describes relatively pure types, of course, and 
these types are seldom so clearly delineated in reality.  Many INGOs perform multiple 
functions and carry out multiple activities.  It is important to clarify these underlying 
differences, however, since they have important implications for which stakeholders and 
accountabilities should take priority. 
 
Table 2: Comparisons of Accountabilities for Different Kinds of INGOs 
 
 Service Delivery INGOs Capacity-Building INGOs Policy Influence INGOs 
INGO Mission 
Focus 
Deliver goods and 
services to underserved 
beneficiaries 
Empower and build 
capacity of clients for 
self-help  






Beneficiaries have moral 
claim to services but may 
be passive recipients  
Clients participation 
essential to define and 
build capacities 
Credibility with targets via 
values, information, or 
representation; 






Donor resources are vital 
to delivery; 
Technical bodies assess 
service quality 
Donor resources are 
important; 
Regulators have legal 
sanctions 
Donor resources from 
many and members; 
Legitimacy grounded in 





Staff and partners are 
means to service delivery 
goals 
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For service delivery INGOs, while beneficiaries have a moral claim to good 
services, much of the power for sanctioning departures from INGO responsibilities rests 
with: 1) donors who underwrite what are often high costs, 2) technical bodies who assess 
the quality of services; and 3) regulators that negotiate terms of service delivery.    
Capacity-building INGOs face many of the same pressures.  Their world is 
complicated by the reality that building local capacity for self-help requires active 
participation by local clients.  Local clients may be passive recipients of services, but 
passivity strikes at the heart of effective capacity-building.  The nature of capacity-
building programs encourages clients to play more active roles in holding INGOs 
accountable.  If terms of accountability that favor client aspirations over those of donors 
cannot be negotiated, it will be very hard for organizations that start off as service 
delivery organizations to make the shift to capacity-building roles.    
The mission of policy influence INGOs depends on their ability to make powerful 
claims on their targets.  Being committed to transcendently important moral values can 
generate that power.  Essential expertise or information about public problems can also 
generate it.  Perhaps most importantly, it will come from enabling the political voice of a 
constituency that needs to be heard.  To ensure authentic voice of some political 
constituency, the INGO must engage with it as a political constituency rather than as a 
service client.  At the limit, the INGO could become a membership organization with a 
governance structure that gave the members the power to use the organization’s voice as 
their own.   
What this Table makes clear, we think, is that the concept of accountability is not 
fixed; there is no single accountability structure that is right for all organizations.  All 
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organizations have to be accountable, but how they structure their accountabilities will 
have a decisive impact on the strategies they can execute.  If an INGO leader inherits the 
accountability system of a policy influence INGO, he or she will find it very difficult to 
sustain a service delivery focus.  The old structure of accountability will tend to anchor 
the organization in its political work and to hamper its efforts at service delivery.  In this 
sense, accountability must be aligned with the strategy that guides the organization. 
These challenges are particularly relevant for INGOs that face a globalizing world 
that calls on them to do more with less, to act as catalysts for rapid change, and to foster 
sustained improvement in intransigent problems of sustainable development, economic 
justice, and political democratization around the world (see Edwards, Hulme and 
Watkins, 1999; Florini, 2000).  INGOs around the world are increasingly in the global 
spotlight as they experiment with evolving strategies, changing functions, and new 
structural forms (Lindenberg and Dobel, 2000).  The challenges of re-framing and 
reorganizing their accountabilities will be central to those efforts.   
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